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1859 
Note 
From House to Home: Creating a Right to Early 
Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims 
Anne C. Johnson∗ 
“Martha Smith’s” boyfriend assaulted and raped her in the 
Wilmington, Delaware, apartment where they had lived for 
over two years.1 Although he did not live there at the time of 
the assault, he knew when Martha would be home and how to 
break into the apartment. Martha called the police after the as-
sault. The investigating officer provided her with sage advice: 
to guarantee her safety she must move immediately, allowing 
neither the perpetrator nor anyone with whom he associated to 
know her whereabouts. Soon thereafter, Martha discussed the 
incident and the officer’s advice with the landlord of her apart-
ment complex. The landlord assured her that she could vacate 
her apartment without any penalty because she had paid 
through the end of the month. Nevertheless, Martha soon re-
ceived a bill for two months’ rent. The landlord’s action was 
consistent with the Delaware landlord-tenant code, which pro-
hibits the termination of month-to-month tenancies without 
sixty days’ prior notice.2 Not only did Martha forfeit her secu-
rity deposit, but she also paid more than $400 in damages in 
order to preserve her credit. 
Domestic violence victims like Martha Smith who flee their 
abusers must consider the financial penalties that exist under 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003, 
Northwestern University. The author thanks Kathaleen McCormick for her 
vision and guidance, Mary Johnson for her attention to detail, as well as the 
editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review. In addition, the author extends 
special thanks to Edward Little and her parents, Jenine Vick and Peter John-
son, for their encouragement and support. Copyright © 2006 by Anne C.  
Johnson. 
 1. Documentation of these facts is on file with Community Legal Aid So-
ciety, Inc., in Wilmington, Delaware [hereinafter “Martha Smith” Documenta-
tion]. The client, whose name has been changed in this Note, has given the au-
thor permission to use the story. 
 2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5106(d) (2004). 
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state landlord-tenant codes.3 In an effort to protect landlord 
rights, state landlord-tenant codes often require notice before 
lease termination.4 Landlord-tenant codes typically recognize 
certain exceptions to the standard notice provisions, allowing 
early termination for military service,5 death, illness, or change 
in employment.6 Until recently, however, the codes have not 
recognized being a victim of a violent crime in one’s own home 
as a worthy exception. Several states have enacted legislative 
reforms to remedy this glaring omission by creating a victim’s 
right to early termination.7 
This Note will examine the necessity and legitimacy of 
state laws that provide domestic violence victims with the right 
to terminate a rental agreement without penalty in order to es-
cape abuse. Part I describes how early-termination statutes 
benefit domestic violence victims, landlords, other tenants, and 
society as a whole. Part II explains why more states must enact 
early-termination statutes in order to protect domestic violence 
victims in rental housing. Part III demonstrates how early-
termination statutes fit into property theory and how they re-
late to property law in practice. Part IV proposes strategies for 
garnering support for early-termination statutes at the state 
level. These laws remove a financial barrier that may otherwise 
discourage victims from leaving their abusers.8 With the help of 
advocates, landlords, and legislators, states can reform their 
landlord-tenant codes to remove this barrier.9 
I.  THE BENEFICIARIES OF EARLY  
TERMINATION LEGISLATION 
Domestic violence is a serious and complex problem.10 Due 
to the complexity of the problem, the law ignores the emotional 
 
 3. Naomi Stern, Early Lease Termination by Battered Tenants, 10 DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 33, 33 (2005). 
 4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.57 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
2570 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.682; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2570(b); TEX. 
PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.017 (Vernon 2005). 
 6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314(b) (2004). 
 7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 
(2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.18.575 (West 2006). 
 8. See Stern, supra note 3, at 33. 
 9. Id. at 47. 
 10. See DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 
1–11 (3d ed. 2000). 
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and psychological components and instead concentrates on the 
more easily identifiable physical effects of abuse.11 The combi-
nation of social ignorance and legal obstacles adds to the chal-
lenges victims face when attempting to leave their abusers.12 
Early-termination statutes eliminate one legal barrier while 
improving the overall situation for landlords and neighbors as 
well. 
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
Domestic violence is prevalent but widely misunderstood.13 
Although many people recognize that domestic violence over-
whelmingly victimizes women,14 they tend to believe most in-
stances of abuse are minor and infrequent, occurring as a result 
of stress or poverty.15 In reality, a woman in the United States 
is abused every seven seconds,16 regardless of her culture, race, 
occupation, income level, or age.17 Four million incidents of do-
mestic violence are reported each year, but estimates project 
that up to ninety percent of battered women never report their 
abuse.18 Moreover, domestic violence constitutes “one of the 
foremost causes of serious injury to women ages 15 to 44.”19 Of-
ficial statistics are not definitive,20 however, and cultural mis-
 
 11. See LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES 
TO INTIMATE ABUSE 76–77 (2003). 
 12. See Emily J. Martin & Naomi S. Stern, Domestic Violence and Public 
Subsidized Housing: Addressing the Needs of Battered Tenants Through Local 
Housing Policy, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 551, 560 (2005) (describing the mis-
conceptions public housing administrators have in regard to tenants who ex-
perience domestic violence); Stern, supra note 3, at 33 (“Landlord-tenant laws 
can trap tenants who are trying to flee abuse by providing no flexibility for a 
battered tenant to terminate her lease early, or by financially penalizing a 
tenant who terminates her lease early to flee abuse.”). 
 13. See BERRY, supra note 10, at 1–11. 
 14. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SELECTED 
FINDINGS: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES 2 (1994). Women constitute more 
than ninety percent of all domestic violence victims in the United States. Id. 
 15. BERRY, supra note 10, at 11. 
 16. Id. at 8. 
 17. PUB. HOUS. MGMT. & OCCUPANCY DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 216 (2003) [hereinafter HUD 
GUIDEBOOK]. 
 18. BERRY, supra note 10, at 7. 
 19. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 231 (1999), 
available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html. 
 20. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 8 (2d ed. 1996). 
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conceptions about the nature of domestic violence and its vic-
tims ultimately prevail. 
Some people—including police, prosecutors, judges, and ju-
rors—believe that victims “provoke” their abusers, thereby 
holding victims responsible for their abuse.21 Nevertheless, 
these people fail to realize that domestic violence entails more 
than men beating women.22 For victimized women, domestic 
violence encompasses physical and emotional abuse.23 Al-
though emotional abuse is an integral part of domestic vio-
lence,24 it is difficult to define or quantify.25 As a result, the law 
traditionally focuses on the physical aspects of abuse and pro-
vides victims of emotional abuse with virtually no legal re-
course.26 
Domestic violence victims stay with their abusers for myr-
iad and complex reasons that are unique to each victim.27 Due 
to psychological abuse or cultural conditioning, some victims 
are unable to examine their relationships rationally and 
leave.28 Victims with fewer resources must weigh the advan-
tages of escaping abuse against the risk of becoming home-
less.29 Approximately fifty percent of homeless women and 
children are escaping domestic violence,30 and the need for 
shelters exceeds the available funding necessary for their 
maintenance.31 Additionally, the risks of serious violence and 
death increase dramatically when a woman separates from her 
 
 21. See Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, 
in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 98, 101 (Eve S. Buzawa & 
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996). 
 22. See RICHARD L. DAVIS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FACTS AND FALLACIES 3 
(1998). 
 23. See MILLS, supra note 11, at 23. 
 24. See id. at 1, 3. 
 25. Id. at 77. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 60 (“The leaving and staying reflect not indecision per se but a 
complex pattern of behavior that involves not only the effect of the violence 
and the partner’s influence but also other psychological and sociocultural fac-
tors.”). 
 28. See DAVIS, supra note 22, at 2. 
 29. Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A., Why Abuse Victims 
Stay, 28 COLO. LAW. 19, 24 (1999). 
 30. See WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, ACLU, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
HOMELESSNESS 2 (2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/ 
dvhomelessness032106.pdf. 
 31. See Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J. 
L. & POL’Y 237, 249–50 (1994). 
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abuser.32 Although protection orders mitigate the risks associ-
ated with domestic violence and homicide,33 they fail to provide 
complete protection for victims.34 
Once victims make the difficult decision to leave their 
abusers,35 those who occupy rental housing face the challenge 
of avoiding fees related to early lease termination.36 In the ab-
sence of laws that exempt domestic violence victims from stan-
dard lease-termination procedures, negotiation with landlords 
serves as victims’ only recourse.37 Some tenants, often with the 
help of attorneys and advocates, succeed in negotiating an early 
end to their lease.38 Because this method depends upon a land-
lord’s discretion, victims lack the guaranteed escape that early-
termination statutes provide.39 Without these statutes, a victim 
must convince their landlord that it is in the landlord’s best in-
terest to release the victim from the rental agreement.40 Unfor-
tunately, a landlord may not realize the advantages of releas-
ing a domestic violence victim from her lease. 
 
 32. See RONET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 4 
(1995). Women separated from their husbands were three times more likely to 
report having been victimized by spouses than divorced women and twenty-
five percent more likely to report having been victimized by spouses than mar-
ried women. Id. 
 33. See Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders 
on Domestic Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS 
WORK?, supra note 21, at 214, 218 (showing that nearly eighty percent of 
women with a temporary protection order said the order was somewhat or 
very helpful in sending the batterer a message that his actions were wrong 
and that less than half of the women thought that the batterer believed he had 
to obey the order). 
 34. See id. at 239–40 (indicating that despite high volumes of calls to po-
lice reporting violations of protection orders, arrests are rare). 
 35. See MILLS, supra note 11, at 61 (explaining that women do not leave 
an abusive relationship without considering the social, emotional, religious, 
and economic costs). 
 36. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.575 (West 2006) (allowing a lease to as-
sign liability for liquidated damages to a tenant who fails to provide the requi-
site notice of termination to the landlord); see also Stern, supra note 3, at 33. 
 37. See Stern, supra note 3, at 34. 
 38. Id.; see also Rhonda McMillion, A Wider Net: ABA Backs Bills That 
Would Expand Support Services for Domestic Violence Victims, A.B.A. J., Dec. 
2005, at 73, 73 (“Recent studies indicate that the single most important factor 
cited by domestic violence victims in their ability to leave their abuser is hav-
ing legal counsel . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402 (2005). 
 40. See Stern, supra note 3, at 34. 
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B. LANDLORDS AND NEIGHBORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS 
Landlords respond to statutory protection for tenants who 
experience domestic violence with concern for the safety and 
quiet enjoyment of other tenants.41 With early-termination 
laws, landlords struggle to understand the policy behind releas-
ing a tenant from a lease who has introduced criminal activity 
at the unit.42 The beauty behind policies that accommodate 
domestic violence victims lies in the fact that they encourage 
victims to take steps toward leaving their abusers and ending 
the violence.43 If victims know they have a range of options, 
they are less likely to keep the violence a secret, and the com-
munity is spared from future violence.44 Although some land-
lords raise concerns about perpetrators returning to the rental 
unit after the victim vacates, these concerns are generally un-
founded; abusers target specific intimates or family members, 
not random individuals.45 Also, allowing victims to terminate 
their leases early may prevent or reduce physical damage to 
the unit caused by violence.46 Indeed, early-termination stat-
utes may save landlords the inconvenience of repairing units. 
If landlords realize the benefits of early-termination stat-
utes for themselves and all their tenants, they may embrace 
negotiations and legislative proposals that benefit domestic vio-
lence victims.47 Although domestic violence victims may be able 
to terminate a lease early by negotiating with their landlords, 
they have no guarantee that every landlord will accommodate 
such a request.48 Early-termination statutes provide victims 
with the assurance that negotiations lack, in addition to offer-
ing a palatable alternative to enduring more abuse. 
II.  THE NEED FOR EARLY-TERMINATION LEGISLATION 
The overwhelming majority of states fail to provide domes-
tic violence victims with a right to early lease termination.49 At 
 
 41. See, e.g., H.R. 58-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Martin & Stern, supra note 12, at 560. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Stern, supra note 3, at 45. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 
(2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
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the federal level as well, such protections are scarce. 
The Supreme Court has declined to recognize a fundamen-
tal right to be free from private acts of violence,50 and Congress 
protects only victims in federally assisted housing through its 
recently expanded Violence Against Women Act.51 In addition, 
landlord reluctance to negotiate with victims creates an obsta-
cle for those trying to leave their abusers.52 State early-
termination statutes expand existing protections to protect vic-
tims who remain vulnerable under existing law. 
A. NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM VIOLENCE 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”53 The Due Process 
Clause not only guarantees fair procedure, but also protects 
liberty interests.54 To defend against a substantive due process 
claim, states must provide a compelling state interest to justify 
state action that limits a fundamental right.55 If the federal 
government were to recognize a fundamental right to be free 
from violence, states might be barred from penalizing domestic 
violence victims who terminate their leases early in order to es-
cape abuse.56 A state’s asserted interests in such penalties 
would almost certainly involve respect for private contracts and 
the promotion of stability in the housing market.57 With strict 
scrutiny as the appropriate standard, however, the state would 
carry a substantial burden of showing that the penalty provi-
sions are “narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state 
interests at stake.”58 
 
§ 59.18.575 (West 2006). 
 50. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
196 (1989) (“[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, lib-
erty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 
individual.”). 
 51. E.g. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 606(5), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 
2960) 3046–47 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5)). 
 52. See Stern, supra note 3, at 334, 345. 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 54. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). 
 55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
 56. See Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1901, 1923 (2001). 
 57. See H.R. 58-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004). 
 58. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
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At present, courts do not recognize a fundamental right to 
be free from violence.59 Nevertheless, the seeds of judicial sup-
port for such a right exist in the established fundamental right 
to bodily integrity.60 This right encompasses a woman’s right to 
control her own person.61 Moreover, “intimate and personal 
choices” that are “central to personal dignity and autonomy[,] 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”62 In considering the traditional right to bodily integrity 
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,63 the Su-
preme Court noted that the common law characterizes the 
touching of one person by another without consent or legal jus-
tification as battery.64 Since then, at least one federal district 
court has declared that the government has some duty to pro-
tect victims of domestic violence from their partners.65 Despite 
this headway, courts are unlikely to recognize a fundamental 
right to be free from violence.66 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed reluctance to 
“expand the concept of substantive due process”67 to new liberty 
interests “without the guidance of the more specific provisions 
of the Bill of Rights.”68 In addition to this unwillingness to cre-
ate a new fundamental right through judge-made law,69 the 
Court views the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting citizens 
 
 59. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
191 (1989) (holding that the state had no constitutional duty to protect a child 
after receiving complaints of possible abuse at the hands of his father). 
 60. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952) (deciding that the 
act of a police officer forcing the defendant to vomit in order to obtain evidence 
“shocks the conscience”). 
 61. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 (1992) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 62. Id. at 851 (majority opinion). 
 63. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990). 
 64. Id. at 269 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 65. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Just 
as the government has a responsibility to protect children from an abusive 
parent, so too does the government have a responsibility to protect a victim of 
domestic violence from her partner . . . .”). 
 66. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 953 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“‘The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to ille-
gitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.’” (quoting Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986))). 
 67. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
 68. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
 69. See id. 
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from the state, not from each other.70 This principle shields citi-
zens from state-conducted violence, but not from private acts of 
violence.71 Therefore, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence pre-
sents formidable obstacles to judicial recognition of a funda-
mental right to be free from violence.72 As a result, domestic 
violence victims must look elsewhere for protection from early-
lease-termination penalties. 
B. LANDLORD RESISTANCE 
When domestic violence victims approach their landlords 
about terminating their lease, they may encounter outright 
hostility or—as evidenced by Martha Smith—sympathy coupled 
with reluctance to forfeit damages.73 In states without early-
termination statutes, victims face tedious negotiations with 
their landlords.74 Victims who secure an advocate gain an ad-
vantage by having a skilled negotiator parlay a formal, mutual 
lease-termination agreement.75 Nevertheless, an advocate often 
fails to convince the landlord that the gravity and urgency of 
the tenant’s situation justifies breaking the lease.76 As a result, 
many victims face the unconscionable choice of staying with an 
abuser or instead opting to incur financial lease-termination 
penalties, ruin their credit rating, and risk homelessness.77 
According to early-termination bill sponsors, landlords 
 
 70. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
196–97 (1989). 
 71. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 2271, 2272, 2285 (1990). 
 72. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 195–97; see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 
715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (1983) (describing the Constitution as a “charter of nega-
tive rather than positive liberties” and the Fourteenth Amendment as “pro-
tect[ing] Americans from oppression by state government, not . . . secur[ing] 
them basic governmental services”). 
 73. Katrina Johnson, Gov’t Affairs Coordinator, Jane Doe Inc., Testimony 
Presented to the Massachusetts General Court Senate Housing Committee in 
Support of S. 2328 (June 16, 2005), http://www.janedoe.org/involved/S793-
Housing%20Testimonyweb.pdf; see also “Martha Smith” Documentation, su-
pra note 1. 
 74. See Stern, supra note 3, at 34, 44. 
 75. See id. at 45. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Editorial, Family Violence: A Residential Lease Should Not Stand 
Between Victims of Family Violence and Safety, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 8, 
2005, at 8B [hereinafter Family Violence] (“Victims who are compelled to flee 
to save their life or ensure their children’s safety should not hesitate to leave 
because breaking their lease would harm their credit rating, rental history 
and ability to find other housing.”). 
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typically oppose domestic violence housing legislation.78 Public 
housing authorities, landlord associations, and even law firms 
that represent landlords monitor legislative proposals that may 
carry a negative impact.79 Some landlords voice concerns that 
tenants will abuse such protections in order to break a lease.80 
Others worry that early-termination statutes create a special 
class of people exempt from general leasing rules and eventu-
ally will lead to domestic violence victims having the freedom to 
violate other contractual obligations.81 Most importantly, land-
lords comprehend the risk of financial losses if they are unable 
to locate a new renter soon after a domestic violence victim 
terminates a lease.82 In sum, many landlords remain uncon-
vinced that the “emergency nature of the domestic violence 
situation” merits a lease-termination exception for victims.83 
C. VAWA 2005 AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS IN 
FEDERALLY ASSISTED HOUSING 
Although landlords often fail to recognize the severity of 
domestic violence, Congress acknowledged the epidemic84 over 
a decade ago when it began policing domestic violence with the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).85 VAWA made 
 
 78. Telephone Interview with Bryan Baker, Legislative Assistant to Fla. 
State Representative Anne Gannon (Aug. 22, 2005); Telephone Interview with 
Janet Cowell, N.C. State Senator (July 29, 2005); Telephone Interview with 
Jeremy Powers, Legislative Assistant to Mass. State Senator Brian Joyce 
(July 29, 2005); Telephone Interview with Matthew J. Heckles, Executive As-
sistant, Del. State Hous. Auth. (Aug. 1, 2005). 
 79. See, e.g., Legislature Takes Aim at Landlords, 7 LANDLORD NEWS, 
Mar. 2005, at 1, 1–3, available at http://www.htspc.com/media/uploads/ 
e3a1d4606a.pdf; Letter from Nat’l Hous. Conference et al. to Arlen Specter, 
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. (June 8, 2005), http://www.nhc.org/index/ 
policy-action-sign-on-060805J; PROP. MGMT. ASS’N OF MICH., 2005 LEGISLA-
TIVE REPORT AND 2006 FORECAST (2005), http://www.pmamhq.com/ 
courses.asp?id=25063&page=3. 
 80. H.R. 58-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004) (“[The early-termination provision] is 
based on self-reporting. Now anyone can say I am a victim and then get out of 
a lease.”); Telephone Interview with Matthew J. Heckles, supra note 78. 
 81. Wash. H.R. 58-1645. 
 82. See Family Violence, supra note 77. 
 83. Stern, supra note 3, at 45. 
 84. See BERRY, supra note 10, at 11 (“In the words of Senator Joseph Bi-
den, ‘If the leading newspapers were to announce tomorrow a new disease 
that, over the past year, had afflicted from three to four million citizens, few 
would fail to appreciate the seriousness of the illness. Yet, when it comes to 
the three to four million women who are victimized by violence each year, the 
alarms ring softly.’”). 
 85. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902–55 (1994). 
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domestic violence a federal crime under certain circum-
stances,86 mandated creation of the National Domestic Violence 
Hotline,87 provided training to help local, state, and federal 
agencies deal with domestic violence crimes,88 and authorized 
funding to ensure legal representation for domestic violence 
victims.89 On January 5, 2006, President Bush signed into law 
the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reau-
thorization Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005).90 In light of VAWA’s suc-
cess in improving the criminal justice response to domestic vio-
lence, Congress expanded the original criminal focus to housing 
and employment protections.91 Additionally, VAWA 2005 effec-
tively creates a right of early lease termination for domestic 
violence victims who participate in the federal Section 8 and 
public housing programs.92 
Federally assisted housing refers to the broad category of 
housing either owned or subsidized by the government, includ-
ing inter alia Section 8 and public housing.93 Under the Section 
8 housing program,94 the U.S. Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) helps very low-income families, the 
elderly, and the disabled “afford decent, safe and sanitary hous-
ing” in the private housing market.95 There are several vari-
ants of the Section 8 program.96 Under the more common pro-
 
 86. See id. § 40221, 108 Stat. 1796, 1926–27 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2261 (2000)) (punishing anyone who crosses state or tribal lines and 
either intends to or in fact commits an act of domestic violence). 
 87. Id. § 40211, 108 Stat. 1796, 1925–26 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 10416). 
 88. Id. § 40231, 108 Stat. 1796, 1932–34 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3796hh). 
 89. Id. § 40114, 108 Stat. 1796, 1910; see also McMillion, supra note 38, at 
73. 
 90. Pub. L. No. 109-162, 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 2960. 
 91. See McMillion, supra note 38, at 73. 
 92. See Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 606(5), 607(3)–(4), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 
Stat.) 2960, 3046–47, 3049 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(1)(5)–(6), 
1437f(r)(5)). 
 93. See generally Fred Fuchs, Introduction to HUD Conventional Public 
Housing, Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher, and Subsidized Housing Pro-
grams, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 782, 782–92, 990–1000 (1991) (describing the 
various types of federally assisted housing programs). 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000). Congress enacted this program through the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 
Stat. 633. 
 95. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2005); see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; 24 C.F.R. § 982.201. 
 96. See Fuchs, supra note 93, at 990 (naming the different section 8 pro-
grams created by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974). 
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grams,97 HUD provides federal funds to public housing agen-
cies (PHAs), which administer the program locally.98 If an indi-
vidual meets Section 8 criteria,99 the local PHA subsidizes the 
private landlord’s rent at a rate based on the tenant’s in-
come.100 Public housing, on the other hand, constitutes housing 
owned by the government,101 wherein the local PHA serves as 
the landlord,102 and rent is calculated based on what each ten-
ant can actually pay.103 The guidelines governing these pro-
grams are relied upon widely by other forms of subsidized hous-
ing as well.104 
Before VAWA 2005, Section 8 tenants could move and con-
tinue to receive housing assistance only if they notified the 
PHA ahead of time, terminated their existing lease within the 
lease provisions, and located acceptable housing.105 Now, Sec-
tion 8 tenants can circumvent these requirements if they (1) 
complied with all other Section 8 obligations, (2) moved in order 
to protect someone who is or has been a domestic violence vic-
tim, and (3) “reasonably believed” that they were “imminently 
threatened by harm from further violence” by staying in the 
subsidized unit.106 
Similarly, Section 8 and public housing tenants originally 
faced losing their federal assistance if they or a family member 
were involved in criminal activity related to domestic violence 
anywhere on the rental property.107 With VAWA 2005, PHAs 
cannot consider this type of activity as cause for terminating 
either the tenancy or the “occupancy rights” of the victim.108 
 
 97. Amy R. Bowser, One Strike and You’re Out—Or Are You?: Rucker’s 
Influence on Future Eviction Proceedings for Section 8 and Public Housing, 
108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 611, 617 (2003) (explaining that the two main types of 
section 8 housing are tenant-based housing and project-based housing). 
 98. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.103, 982.104. 
 99. See id. § 982.202. 
 100. Id. § 982.1. 
 101. See Fuchs, supra note 93, at 782. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 787. 
 104. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c), 1437f(d) (2000) (governing lease terms 
and policies); see also Fuchs, supra note 93, at 998 (showing that subsidized 
housing programs rely on § 1437f(d) in determining preferences for appli-
cants). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5); 24 C.F.R. § 982.314. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 606(5), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 2960) 
3046–47 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5)). 
 107. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5)–(6); id. § 1437f(o)(7)(C)–(D). 
 108. Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 606(5), 607(3)–(4), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 
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The “occupancy rights” language may prevent PHAs from deny-
ing public housing eligibility to tenants who need to move in 
order to escape future violence.109 Moreover, victims in other 
federally assisted programs could potentially claim the same 
right by relying on the same provision.110 If this language fails 
to protect domestic violence victims in these situations, Con-
gress presumably may extend VAWA with future amendments 
in order to ensure victims in public housing—and possibly 
other federally assisted programs—the right to early lease ter-
mination. Despite the potential limitations of VAWA 2005, 
many domestic violence victims no longer have to choose be-
tween losing their federal assistance and living in an abusive 
environment.111 Unfortunately, even the broadest interpreta-
tion of VAWA 2005 fails to protect domestic violence victims 
outside federally assisted housing programs.112 
Despite a few provisions addressing early-termination 
rights, federal law fails to protect all domestic violence victims 
who reside in rental housing.113 Landlord opposition frustrates 
legislative proposals that would protect domestic violence vic-
tims,114 and the courts hesitate to extend constitutional juris-
prudence to create broad protections for victims of private vio-
lence.115 Nevertheless, legislators can find a basis for creating a 
victims’ right to early termination in the theory and practice of 
American property law. 
 
Stat. 2960) 3046–47, 3049 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(1)(5)–(6), 
1437f(r)(5)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Fuchs, supra note 93, at 998. 
 111. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5) (requiring tenants to legally termi-
nate their lease and provide advance notice to the local PHA before leaving 
their unit in order to retain their section 8 vouchers), with § 606(5), 2006 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 2960) 3046–47 (allowing domestic violence victims to 
retain their section 8 vouchers if they fail to meet the prior requirements but 
are threatened by future violence). Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(l)(5)–(6), 
1437f(o)(7)(C)–(D) (terminating the tenancy of any tenant who “threatens . . . 
the right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises”), with §§ 606(4)(B)–(C), 
607(3)–(4), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 2960) 3044–46 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1437d(1)(5)–(6), 1437f(o)(7)(C)–(D)) (excluding “incidents of actual or 
threatened domestic violence” and “criminal activity directly relating to do-
mestic violence” from the acceptable grounds upon which PHAs may terminate 
tenancies). 
 112. § 606(5), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 2960) 3046–47. 
 113. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r). 
 114. E.g., Telephone Interview with Bryan Baker, supra note 78. 
 115. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
191 (1988). 
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III.  EARLY-TERMINATION STATUTES AND THE LAW 
A. EARLY LEASE TERMINATION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS IN THEORY 
The Framers of the Constitution believed that the right to 
acquire and own property was fundamental to the enjoyment of 
liberty.116 As a result, the Supreme Court has defended prop-
erty rights against legislative restriction throughout American 
history.117 The Court has also adopted balancing tests that as-
sess the government’s interest in regulating property owner-
ship,118 despite a popular belief that zealous protection of own-
ership interests restricts equitable redistribution of property 
rights.119 Developments in property law that allow the govern-
ment to reallocate property rights between parties challenge 
the traditional view of property heralded by the Framers.120 
Moreover, these legal developments demonstrate the law’s re-
distributive nature in its attempts to achieve fairness.121 Look-
ing beneath the absolutist impressions, established property 
law and intuition about human dignity challenge the wide-
spread misconceptions about unconditional ownership. 
On the surface, absolutist rhetoric pervades “common 
sense” notions about property rights in that most people pre-
sume that individuals’ exclusive possession and control over 
property characterizes ownership.122 Upon closer examination, 
however, theorists argue that this absolutist rhetoric is not an 
accurate depiction of property rights in the United States.123 
 
 116. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 43 (2d ed. 
1998). 
 117. See id. at 160. 
 118. Id. at 160–61; see also Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the 
Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 204 (1996) (“The 
United States Supreme Court has responded to this problem with an answer 
of deceit: a rigid or absolute model of property is articulated, while a contin-
gent model is in fact (silently) used.”). 
 119. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 907, 915–16 (1993). 
 120. See Joan Williams, Recovering the Full Complexity of Our Traditions: 
New Developments in Property Theory, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 601 (1996); see 
also Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 118, at 203 (“The idea of property as 
‘rights,’ bounded and protected, will persist in our society and culture.”). 
 121. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 611, 663–83 (1988). 
 122. Williams, supra note 120, at 598–99. 
 123. See Singer, supra note 121, at 663–83; Underkuffler-Freund, supra 
note 118, at 204. 
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For example, the common law doctrines of adverse posses-
sion,124 the public trust doctrine,125 and the implied warranty of 
habitability (IWH)126 operate in opposition to absolutist rheto-
ric by altering “common sense” notions of property rights.127 
First, the doctrine of adverse possession transfers title from an 
owner to a trespasser who occupies the owner’s land for a 
statutorily determined time period (among other require-
ments).128 Second, the public trust doctrine requires the gov-
ernment to limit an owner’s exclusive use of property when 
that use interferes with the general welfare.129 Third, IWH 
permits tenants to withhold rent payments until landlords 
make necessary improvements in order to render units habit-
able.130 These legal devices constitute a common and dynamic 
enterprise in which the initial allocation of property rights does 
not necessarily dictate future outcomes between original par-
ties.131 
American law routinely redistributes rights in order to 
remedy social inequalities.132 The public’s absolutist conception 
of property rights to the contrary results from the Framers’ fo-
cus on protecting property from redistribution.133 In order to 
 
 124. Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person who wrongfully oc-
cupies another person’s land will gain title to that land if the possession is (1) 
actual, (2) open and notorious, (3) hostile, (4) exclusive, (5) continuous, (6) for a 
period of time defined by the statute of limitations, (7) under a claim of right 
or of title (sometimes), and (8) in good faith. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., 
THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7 (2nd ed. 1993). 
 125. The public trust doctrine is a collection of common law principles dic-
tating that some natural resources are held in trust by the government for the 
public’s benefit. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW § 2.16 (1977). 
 126. The implied warranty of habitability refers to the interpretation of 
common law or state housing codes to require a nondisclaimable warranty of 
habitability in all residential leases. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 124, 
§§ 6.38–.40. Landlords must keep apartments in a habitable condition or else 
be liable for breach of the lease, in which case the tenant may be able to pay 
little or no rent until the landlord improves the living conditions. See Singer, 
supra note 121, at 679–80. 
 127. See Singer, supra note 121, at 663–83. 
 128. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 124, § 11.7. 
 129. Singer, supra note 121, at 674–75. 
 130. See id. at 679–80. 
 131. Id. at 657. Singer wants “to recognize the reliance interest in prop-
erty . . . by vulnerable persons on relationships with others as legitimate and 
good . . . and as worthy of legal protection.” Id. at 699–700. 
 132. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3 (1990). 
 133. See id. (“It was thus not property as such, but the effort to protect 
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leave this absolutism behind, one commentator insists on con-
ceiving of property rights as the “ever shifting product of collec-
tive decision-making.”134 Skeptics criticize this approach as it 
smacks of eliminating any possibility of stability and predict-
ability in determining property rights within and beyond in-
stances of social injustice.135 Rather than deny existing dualis-
tic conceptions of property, these critics argue for a legal 
system that accommodates both notions.136 This task could be 
accomplished by preserving stable property rights while provid-
ing for instances in which the current distribution of property 
changes in order to prevent inequities.137 
Another method designed to reallocate property rights fo-
cuses on the language surrounding property.138 This approach 
examines the rhetoric of property both outside of, and within, 
the law in order to highlight redistributive notions in the pub-
lic’s complex and conflicting beliefs about property.139 In formu-
lating themes of property rights, supporters of this theory pin-
point the intuition that, at times, property rights present a 
threat to human dignity.140 Because arguments based on hu-
man dignity appear vague and sentimental in juxtaposition to 
an economic—albeit misleading—presentation, they function 
best through statements of facts in cases at issue.141 For exam-
ple, one theorist describes an IWH case in which a conscien-
tious tenant had occupied an apartment that reeked of excre-
ment and in which plaster collapsed on a crib, broken windows 
threatened toddlers’ hands, locks were inadequate, and the 
plumbing did not work.142 These details appeal to the public’s 
intuition that human dignity trumps absolutist conceptions of 
property rights,143 while creating an environment in which al-
 
property . . . that has had distorting consequences.”). 
 134. Id. at 274. 
 135. See Laura S. Underkuffler, The Perfidy of Property, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
293, 315 (1999). 
 136. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 118, at 203–04. 
 137. See id. at 191–93. 
 138. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 304–08 
(1998). 
 139. Id. at 305. 
 140. See Williams, supra note 120, at 605. Williams discusses the emer-
gence of human dignity themes in discussions of commoditization and implied 
warranty of habitability cases. Id. 
 141. Id. at 606. 
 142. Id. (citing Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984)). 
 143. See Williams, supra note 120, at 605. 
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ternative visions of property and ownership can reclaim a cen-
tral role in the law.144 
Domestic violence embodies an affront to victims’ human 
dignity.145 Upon hearing about terrifying assaults like that of 
“Martha Smith,”146 it is difficult to understand why most states’ 
laws fail to provide victims with an exception to normal lease-
termination procedures.147 At the same time, “common sense” 
impressions about property teach that a landlord has a right to 
receive rent payments for the duration of a lease.148 This con-
ception, however, need not prevent the law from redistributing 
a property right from a landlord to a victimized tenant. Indeed, 
the existing legal tools of adverse possession, the public trust 
doctrine, and the IWH demonstrate the reallocation of property 
rights from landlords to tenants.149 
B. EARLY LEASE TERMINATION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
VICTIMS IN PRACTICE 
In granting victims a right to early termination, the law 
places victims’ human dignity and what would otherwise con-
stitute social inequality above landlords’ economic interests. 
Landlords lose relatively little under an early-termination sce-
nario compared to what the law takes from owners in applying 
the IWH, public trust, and adverse possession doctrines.150 
When an individual owns beachfront property, for example, she 
lacks the right to exclude the public from using her land up to 
the high water mark because use of such land benefits the gen-
eral welfare.151 The existence of early-termination laws like-
wise benefits the general welfare by protecting victims and 
neighbors from violence, but without creating a windfall for vic-
tims.152 As long as victims remain in the unit—and in some in-
 
 144. See Williams, supra note 138, at 361. 
 145. See BERRY, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
 146. See “Martha Smith” Documentation, supra note 1. 
 147. See Williams, supra note 120, at 605–06. 
 148. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: 
NOMOS XXII 69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (“To 
own property is to have exclusive control of something—to be able . . . to sell 
it . . . .”). 
 149. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 124, §§6.38–.40, 11.7; RODGERS, 
supra note 125, § 2.16. 
 150. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 124, § 11.7; Singer, supra note 
121, at 674–75, 679–80. 
 151. Singer, supra note 121, at 674–75. 
 152. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575(2) (West 2006) (“The ten-
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stances for a time period after vacating—they must continue to 
pay rent.153 
Similarly, the IWH allows tenants to live in an apartment 
at reduced or no cost, but they receive less of a windfall than 
the public enjoys under the public trust doctrine due to the un-
inhabitable conditions of their residence.154 Nevertheless, ten-
ants exercising their rights under the IWH use landlords’ prop-
erty without full compensation.155 Victims utilizing an early-
termination statute stop paying rent only upon vacating the 
premises,156 and the landlord then may generate rent from a 
new tenant. Additionally, cotenants of victims who terminate 
their lease early are still liable for rent.157 
In a more severe redistribution, adverse possession seizes 
title from the original owner and vests it in a trespasser due to 
society’s preference for productive land use.158 An early-
termination exception for domestic violence victims allows 
landlords to retain full title to their property, while simply re-
stricting their cash flow temporarily.159 Once a victim termi-
nates her lease, the landlord is free to rent to another tenant 
immediately or to continue collecting rent from any remaining 
cotenants.160 By comparison, early-termination statutes appear 
much more reasonable. 
In fact, many states allow tenants enlisted in the armed 
services to terminate a rental agreement upon providing proof 
of orders for active duty, transfer, or discharge that require re-
 
ant shall remain liable for the rent for the month in which he or she termi-
nated the rental agreement . . . .”). 
 153. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402(2)(b) (2005) (holding tenants 
responsible for one month’s rent following vacation of the premises). 
 154. See Singer, supra note 121, at 674–75. 
 155. See id. at 679–80. 
 156. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575(2). 
 157. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453(4) (West 2005) (“Notwithstand-
ing the release from a rental agreement of a tenant who is a victim, any other 
tenant remains subject to the rental agreement.”). 
 158. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 124, § 11.7. Policy also supports the 
doctrine of adverse possession due to its ability to stabilize uncertain bounda-
ries over time and to protect persons who have invested in the land or dealt 
with the adverse possessor in reliance upon her apparent ownership. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (Vernon 2005) (explaining 
that a domestic violence victim may vacate the rental unit before the end of 
the lease term and avoid liability for future rent). 
 160. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575(2); see also H.R. 5, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess., 
§ 1 (Fla. 2006); S. 2328, 184th Gen. Ct, Reg. Sess. § 9 (Mass. 2006). 
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location.161 Delaware even allows serious illness, acceptance 
into public housing, admittance into a home for the elderly, and 
a change in location of employment to create a tenants’ right to 
terminate their lease early.162 In states allowing military per-
sonnel to terminate rental agreements early, the legislature re-
distributes landlords’ property interests on behalf of individu-
als who have voluntarily—excluding rare instances of a draft—
chosen a lifestyle that may require unpredictable transfers. 
Moreover, illness and work relocation often prove equally un-
predictable. Nonetheless, most states are unwilling to interfere 
with the same property rights in order to protect domestic vio-
lence victims who are abused against their will and require re-
location for their safety. 
The aforementioned legal mechanisms redistribute owner-
ship rights to others out of concern for the general welfare, hab-
itable living conditions, and—in the most drastic reallocation 
under adverse possession—productivity in land use.163 Early-
termination exceptions for domestic violence victims also pro-
mote the general welfare and habitable living conditions of vic-
tims, families, and all tenants in a shared complex.164 For in-
stance, a residence wrought with abuse is just as dangerous 
and uninhabitable as one without working plumbing and bro-
ken windows. Yet in promoting interests similar to those en-
dorsed by the public trust doctrine and the IWH, early-
termination provisions impose fewer restrictions on landlords’ 
rights. 
IV.  THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF CREATING A RIGHT  
TO EARLY TERMINATION 
Oregon, Washington, Colorado, North Carolina, and Texas 
have laws that allow domestic violence victims to terminate a 
rental agreement without financial penalty.165 Five states have 
 
 161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314(b)(5) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 83.682 (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2570(b) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 42-45.1; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.475; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.017; VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55-248.21:1 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.200(b). 
 162. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314. 
 163. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 124, § 11.7; Singer, supra note 
121, at 674–75, 679–80. 
 164. See generally BERRY, supra note 10, at 2–11 (describing the frequent 
occurrence and severity of domestic violence along with the effects on victims 
and others). 
 165. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; WASH. REV. CODE 
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proposed legislation aimed at providing this same right with 
varying levels of success.166 By examining the approaches of 
each proposal, other states can create a strategy for generating 
their own early-termination statutes. A survey of existing laws, 
victim needs, and landlord concerns suggests that new laws 
should amend existing landlord-tenant codes, make landlord 
rights and obligations explicit, guarantee victims the right to 
stay if they so choose, and employ dialogue among advocates, 
legislators, and landlords during the legislative process. 
A. EXISTING EARLY-TERMINATION STATUTES 
States that have succeeded in creating early-termination 
statutes utilize similar techniques in drafting their legislation. 
In framing the class of tenants who qualify for early termina-
tion, legislators refer to state domestic violence statutes for 
definitions and verifications of victim status.167 Early-
termination statutes also provide procedural guidelines for 
when and how victims may terminate their leases without fi-
nancial penalties.168 
Early-termination statutes do not establish a novel defini-
tion of what constitutes domestic violence.169 The trend in exist-
ing law is to refer to preexisting definitions of domestic violence 
in the state code.170 Similarly, preexisting statutory definitions 
of sexual assault, stalking, and abuse often accompany domes-
tic violence as valid reasons for early termination of a rental 
agreement.171 Early-termination statutes require tenants to 
 
ANN. § 59.18.575. See J. Norton Cabell, Rental Forum: Domestic Violence Laws 
Benefit Tenants, OREGONIAN, Aug. 29, 2004, at H24. 
 166. H.R. 5, 2006 Leg., 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); S. 2328, 184th Gen. Ct, 
Reg. Sess. § 9 (Mass. 2006); H.R. 194, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005); H.R. 
2317, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2004); H.R. 2864, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2004). 
 167. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.453; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.18.570. 
 168. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 59.18.575. 
 169. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.453; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.18.570; see also Fla. H.R. 5; Mass. S. 2328; Utah H.R. 194; Ariz. H.R. 
2317; Kan. H.R. 2864. 
 170. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.570 (“‘Domestic violence’ has 
the same meaning as set forth in [Section] 26.50.010.”). 
 171. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. 
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verify their status as domestic violence victims according to the 
statutory definition.172 Providing the landlord with a valid pro-
tection order173 or a copy of a police report174 constitutes the 
most common way in which a tenant may prove victim 
status.175 Some states allow a “qualified third party” who is act-
ing in her official capacity to submit a report verifying the ten-
ant is a victim of domestic violence.176 Such statutes provide a 
form that illustrates the type of information a qualified third 
party should include in a report.177 These forms generally in-
clude a signed statement by the tenant that he or she or a mi-
nor member of the household suffered abuse on a particular 
date and that the statement supports his or her request to be 
released from a rental agreement.178 The form also contains the 
name and contact information of a law enforcement officer who 
 
STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575; Fla. H.R. 5; Mass. S. 
2328; Utah H.R. 194; Kan. H.R. 2864. 
 172. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.453; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.18.575; see also Fla. H.R. 5; Mass. S. 2328; Utah H.R. 194; Ariz. H.R. 
2317. 
 173. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.453; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; WASH REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 59.18.575; see also Fla. H.R. 5; Mass. S. 2328; Utah H.R. 194; Ariz. H.R. 
2317. 
 174. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; see 
also Mass. S. 2328; Utah H.R. 194; Ariz. H.R. 2317; Kan. H.R. 2864. 
 175. The North Carolina Code requires tenants to provide either a safety 
plan along with a permanent protection order or a criminal restraining order, 
or a valid “Address Confidentiality Program” card. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-
45.1(a). A valid safety plan (1) must be dated during the term of the tenancy at 
issue, (2) must be provided by a domestic violence program that meets appli-
cable statutory requirements, and (3) must recommend relocation of the vic-
tim. Id. The Texas Property Code requires a temporary injunction for verifica-
tion purposes, as well. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016. Both state laws and 
Kansas’s bill would allow a criminal restraining order to constitute verification 
of domestic violence victim status. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1(a); 
Kan. H.R. 2864 § 3. 
 176. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.570; see also Kan. H.R. 2864 § 3; Mass. 
S. 2328 § 9. Washington’s law classifies law enforcement officers, employees of 
a court of the state, licensed mental health professionals or other licensed 
counselors, employees of crime victim/witness programs who are trained advo-
cates for the program, and members of the clergy as qualified third parties. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.570. Massachusetts Senate Bill 2328 adds at-
torneys and social workers to Washington’s list of qualified third parties. 
Mass. S. 2328 § 9. 
 177. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575; 
see also Mass. S. 2328 § 9. Oregon allows only law enforcement officers to 
complete a verification form. § 90.453. 
 178. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453. 
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verifies the victim’s statement by signing the document.179 
Typically, victims of domestic violence who wish to termi-
nate a lease early also must provide written notice of termina-
tion to the landlord.180 Many provisions require filing the notice 
within two or three months of the reported violence.181 In some 
states, the rental agreement terminates as soon as the landlord 
receives written notice.182 Other states specify the lease termi-
nates after a set time period that follows the delivery of written 
notice to the landlord.183 Domestic violence victims who termi-
nate a lease subject to an early-termination statute avoid rent 
liability after the termination date in most cases.184 In addition, 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575; see also 
H.R. 5, 2006 Leg., 108th Reg. Sess., § 1 (Fla. 2006); Kan. H.R. 2864 § 4; Mass. 
S. 2328 § 9. Utah House Bill 194 does not require the notice to be in writing. 
H.R. 194, 56th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 3 (Utah 2005). Arizona House Bill 2317 does 
not require the victim to provide to the landlord a notice of intent to terminate 
the rental agreement that is separate from the verification documentation. See 
H.R. 2317, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ariz. 2004). 
 181. Oregon and Washington require a written termination notice within 
ninety days of the reported act of domestic violence. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 90.453; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575. In Colorado, a victim must pro-
vide written notice of termination within sixty days of the issuance of a police 
report or protection order. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402. Floridians would 
have to deliver written notice of termination to the landlord no later than fif-
teen days after the permanent injunction against the perpetrator is entered. 
Fla. H.R. 5 §1. Texas does not indicate a specific time period in which a victim 
must submit a written termination notice in relation to the act of domestic vio-
lence. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (Vernon 2005). The Kansas and Arizona 
bills similarly do not indicate a specific time period. See Kan. H.R. 2864 § 4; 
Ariz. H.R. 2317 § 2. 
 182. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575. 
Under the Texas Property Code, termination is effective as soon as (1) a judge 
has signed an injunction or order against the perpetrator, (2) the victim has 
delivered a copy of the order to the landlord, and (3) the victim has vacated the 
rental unit. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016; see also Mass. S. 2328 § 9(2)(b). 
 183. Oregon, Utah, and Arizona provisions allow termination to occur no 
sooner than fourteen days after delivery of written notice. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 90.453; Utah H.R. 194 § 3; Ariz. H.R. 2317 § 2. The North Carolina Code 
permits victims to terminate a rental agreement thirty days after providing 
written notice. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1(a); see Fla. H.R. 5 § 1. Kansas House 
Bill 2864 would allow victims to terminate a lease in fifteen days or less. Kan. 
H.R. 2864 § 4. 
 184. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575; see also Fla. H.R. 5 § 1; Mass. S. 2328 § 9; Ariz. 
H.R. 2317 § 2. In Colorado, victims may be liable for the rent of the month fol-
lowing notice of termination if the landlord produces documents to support the 
existence of damages as a result of the victim’s early termination. COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 38-12-402. Under Texas law, a victim is liable for delinquent, unpaid 
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landlords may not withhold any money from a victim’s deposit 
on the sole basis of the early termination.185 Despite a victim’s 
proper early lease termination, any other tenant on the lease 
remains liable to the landlord.186 
B. CONSTRUCTING AN EARLY-TERMINATION PROVISION 
1. Working Within the Existing Landlord-Tenant Framework 
The states that have succeeded in passing legislation that 
allows domestic violence victims to terminate a lease early have 
done so by amending their existing landlord-tenant codes.187 
This approach allows landlords to readily determine their obli-
gations to tenants who suffer from domestic violence without 
having to comb through scattered provisions of law. By situat-
ing an exception for domestic violence victims within the sec-
tion addressing standard lease-termination procedures, the leg-
islature provides fair notice to landlords. 
From the legislative perspective, focusing on the landlord-
tenant code in crafting a right to early termination for domestic 
violence victims has two notable advantages. First, legislators 
can tailor the actual language creating the domestic violence 
exception to the structure and policy behind each state’s code. 
In a state like Delaware that already allows for several excep-
tions to the standard lease-termination procedure, the legisla-
ture simply can add domestic violence victims to the list of 
other tenants that qualify for exemption.188 States with limited 
or no exceptions to termination procedures, such as Oregon, re-
quire the legislature to construct a provision consistent with 
the landlord-tenant code.189 In both instances, the lawmakers 
 
rent owed before the lease was terminated unless the victim’s lease contains 
language explaining that tenants may have special statutory rights to termi-
nate the lease early in certain situations. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016. 
 185. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575; 
see also Mass. S. 2328 § 9; Ariz. H.R. 2317 § 2; Kan. H.R. 2864 § 4. Colorado 
law allows a landlord to withhold a victim’s deposit if the victim has not paid 
rent within ninety days of termination. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402. Massa-
chusetts and Arizona would require landlords to provide victims with a pro 
rata refund for any prepaid rent. Mass. S. 2328 § 9; Ariz. H.R. 2317 § 2. 
 186. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575(2); see also Fla. H.R. 5 § 1; Mass. S. 2328 § 9. 
 187. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.459; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.585. 
 188. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2004). 
 189. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453. 
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can defer to the definitions of domestic violence that exist else-
where in state law as a result of the reforms of the 1980s.190 
Second, relying on prior determinations prevents the cur-
rent legislature from struggling to define the complex issue of 
domestic violence.191 The benefits are two-fold: legislators can 
focus their efforts on the procedure by which tenants provide 
notice and verification of domestic violence to their landlords, 
and bill sponsors can emphasize the housing aspects of the 
amendment rather than the controversial issue of domestic vio-
lence.192 Despite the legal system adopting definitions and poli-
cies surrounding domestic violence in the late twentieth cen-
tury, domestic violence remains a delicate topic in the political 
sphere.193 The dirty work completed by prior legislators in the 
realm of domestic violence thus affords current and future 
lawmakers the ability to utilize existing definitions and report-
ing procedures in drafting victims’ right to terminate a rental 
agreement. 
2. Preventing Landlord Opposition to Early Termination 
An approach that has aided this type of legislation involves 
ensuring that landlords clearly understand their rights and ob-
ligations under a new proposal.194 In other words, landlords 
want to know how the amendments affect them. Because grant-
ing domestic violence victims the right to early termination al-
ters the distribution in property rights between landlord and 
tenant, landlords understandably scrutinize whether such leg-
islation preserves their interests while benefiting victims. 
Landlord associations voice concern regarding the following is-
sues: (1) whether domestic violence victims can face eviction for 
lease violations; (2) what constitutes sufficient verification of 
domestic violence; (3) whether the law creates a protected class 
for domestic violence victims; (4) how a victim’s deposit should 
be dealt with upon early termination when damages are the re-
sult of a domestic violence incident; and (5) whether a victim’s  
 
 
 190. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.570 (referring to a separate 
statute in defining “domestic violence”). 
 191. See BERRY, supra note 10, at 1–12 (describing the complex nature of 
domestic violence). 
 192. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.570. 
 193. See BERRY, supra note 10, at 11; BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 20, at 
13–25 (describing the social controversy behind domestic violence). 
 194. Telephone Interview with Bryan Baker, supra note 78. 
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cotenants remain liable to the lease despite the victim’s early 
termination.195 Adding a clarifying statement under the land-
lord-tenant provisions of concern easily address all of these is-
sues. For example, under the landlord-tenant code section per-
taining to security deposits, the legislature can elucidate the 
circumstances (if any) in which a landlord may retain a portion 
or all of a victim’s deposit in the event of early termination. 
Bill sponsors need to be aware of and understand the un-
derlying rationale for these and any other concerns that their 
state’s landlords may possess when presenting their proposal. 
A proactive approach involves working with landlords in devel-
oping the legislation. As a result, landlords and domestic vio-
lence advocates understand each other and can compromise 
rather than disregard valid concerns. Bill sponsors’ success 
likely depends on forging cooperation between landlords and 
domestic violence advocates before introducing their legisla-
tion.196 Moreover, a bill that passes through the legislature but 
confuses landlords would fail to fully benefit domestic violence 
victims. 
C. LIMITATIONS AND REWARDS OF EARLY-TERMINATION 
LEGISLATION 
1. Exclusion of Victims 
A drawback to creating precise procedures for domestic vio-
lence victims to take advantage of early-termination provisions 
in landlord-tenant codes is underinclusion. Many domestic vio-
lence victims have limited access to reporting channels. Abus-
ers employ tactics that isolate victims from family, friends, and 
coworkers.197 In addition, victims become prisoners in their 
own homes when their abusers force them to relinquish their 
cars or threaten to harm them if they leave.198 Victims who are 
unable to contact a “qualified third party”199 in order to report 
 
 195. Id.; see H.R. 58-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004). 
 196. Telephone Interview with Bryan Baker, supra note 78; Telephone In-
terview with Janet Cowell, supra note 78; Telephone Interview with Jeremy 
Powers, supra note 78. 
 197. See BERRY, supra note 10, at 2–3. 
 198. Id. at 32. 
 199. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.570 (West Supp. 2006); 
S. 2328, 184th Gen. Ct. § 9 (Mass. 2006); H.R. 2864, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 3(p)(5) (Kan. 2004) (listing professionals that may legally vouch for a victim, 
although not specifically labeled as a “qualified third party”). 
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their abuse cannot provide their landlords with requisite verifi-
cation of domestic violence. 
While domestic violence advocates find this limitation ob-
jectionable, landlords demand clarity in the law when it comes 
to relinquishing their right to receive rent.200 Increased clarity 
for landlord approval of early-termination legislation comes at 
the expense of some victims’ opportunities to flee domestic vio-
lence. Additionally, landlord concerns regarding monetary 
damages sometimes result in statutes that simply decrease 
early-termination fees.201 Given a choice between no early-
termination provision and one that reduces financial penalties, 
however, advocates and legislators accept the latter.202 Despite 
these shortcomings, early-termination statutes provide an es-
cape hatch for many domestic violence victims who otherwise 
find themselves discouraged by full early-termination fees.203 
Furthermore, the existence of these kinds of laws may motivate 
other victims to take the first steps toward leaving their abus-
ers.204 
Another limitation lies in the novelty of laws granting vic-
tims of domestic violence the right to early termination.205 Sub-
sequent interpretations of these statutes could result in the ex-
clusion of more victims. Once advocates know the effects of the 
existing laws, they can propose changes that fine-tune the 
early-termination procedures for victims in order to provide 
greater safety.206 Nevertheless, a potential positive side effect 
of these new laws could be landlords’ increased sensitivity to 
the problem of domestic violence in their housing.207 Although 
 
 200. Telephone Interview with Bryan Baker, supra note 78; see H.R. 58-
1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004). 
 201. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453 
(West Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575; see also H.R. 5, 2006 
Leg., 108th Reg. Sess. § 1 (Fla. 2006); S. 2328, 184th Gen. Ct. § 9 (Mass. 2006); 
H.R. 2317, 46th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ariz. 2004). 
 202. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.453; WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575. 
 203. See Stern, supra note 3, at 33. 
 204. See Martin & Stern, supra note 12, at 560. 
 205. Many of these laws became effective rather recently. COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-12-402 (2005) (promulgated July 1, 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 (ef-
fective October 1, 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (effective March 
15, 2004); Cabell, supra note 165 (noting that Oregon’s law became effective in 
2003). 
 206. See Cabell, supra note 165 (predicting that legislators “will tinker 
with [the new laws] in the upcoming session”). 
 207. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (describing one of the goals of 
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they would have no legal obligation to release victims from 
their leases, landlords may increasingly accept verifications not 
enumerated by law.208 HUD already encourages PHA-
sensitivity to tenants experiencing domestic violence209 and to 
accept “a broad range of evidence as proof of domestic vio-
lence.”210 With the enactment of state legislation, both public 
and private landlords may develop heightened awareness and 
greater patience for domestic violence issues. 
2. Creating Victims’ Right to Leave While Preserving Their 
Right to Stay 
The ability of domestic violence victims to terminate a 
rental agreement without financial penalty does not translate 
into promoting a policy that supports uprooting all victims of 
domestic violence. In circumstances in which victims cannot 
leave or are preparing to leave their rental unit, they require 
enhanced safety measures that protect them from their abusers 
and emphasize the landlord’s continued obligation to victims 
until they physically leave the premises.211 HUD recommends 
that PHAs carefully consider alternatives to eviction for victims 
of domestic violence,212 despite the statutory authority to evict 
tenants associated with criminal activity on the premises.213 
HUD further empowers PHAs to bar abusers from the prem-
ises.214 Although HUD recognizes the importance of maintain-
ing housing for victims, PHAs wield ultimate authority over 
which victims stay and which face eviction.215 On the other 
 
VAWA as educating the public and providing women the assurance that their 
attackers will not be tolerated). 
 208. See HUD GUIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 217–18 (encouraging PHAs to 
accept a wide variety of documentation as proof of victim status). 
 209. Telephone Interview with Matthew J. Heckles, supra note 78. 
 210. HUD GUIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 217–18 (permitting as evidence 
inter alia a victim’s statement, testimony or affidavit describing the facts or 
cruelty of each incident; restraining or civil protection orders; medical records; 
police reports; telephone records; criminal court records; statements from do-
mestic violence advocates; and statements from counselors). 
 211. See Stern, supra note 3, at 45 (reminding advocates about the “privacy 
and confidentiality needs of the tenant”). 
 212. See HUD GUIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 219. 
 213. Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 606(4)(B)–(C), 607(3)–(4), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(119 Stat. 2960) 3044–46 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(1)(5)–(6), 
1437f(o)(7)(C)–(D)). 
 214. See HUD GUIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 219. 
 215. See §§ 606(4)(B)–(C), 607(3)–(4), 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) at 
3044–46. 
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hand, early-termination statutes with built-in protections re-
quire—rather than encourage—landlords to protect domestic 
violence victims’ housing rights.216 
North Carolina’s, Oregon’s, and Washington’s laws provide 
for victims’ safety in these situations by permitting victims to 
request lock changes upon providing the landlord with a court 
order that excludes the abuser from the rental unit.217 Going a 
step further, North Carolina and Oregon allow victims to 
change the locks themselves if the landlord does not respond to 
their lawful request.218 In order to gain landlord support for 
such provisions, domestic violence advocates would need to 
clarify (1) the requisite documentation that a victim must pro-
vide to the landlord in order to exclude a tenant; (2) who is re-
sponsible for the cost of the lock change; (3) that the landlord 
has no liability to the excluded tenant for unlawful ouster when 
acting in accordance with such provisions; (4) whether or not 
the landlord has a duty to allow the excluded tenant to retrieve 
property from the unit; (5) a concrete time period in which a 
landlord must act before tenants may change locks themselves; 
and (6) the time period in which victims must provide a new 
key to landlords after changing the locks themselves. 
Victims also need protection from landlord discrimination 
and retaliation on the basis of their status as a domestic vio-
lence victim219 or their history of utilizing an early-termination 
procedure.220 Disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing 
Act221 may already protect female victims from these sorts of 
activities.222 Additionally, many states have statutes prohibit-
 
 216. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 90.459(2) (West Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.585(1) (West 
Supp. 2006). 
 217. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42.3; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.459(2); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.585(1); see also H.R. 194, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. § 3 
(Utah 2005). 
 218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42.3(c); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.459(2). 
 219. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Testifies on Housing Problems for 
Victims of Violence and Immigrant Domestic Workers (Oct. 17, 2005), http:// 
www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/21228prs20051017.html, (discussing the tes-
timony of three clients who were evicted or threatened with eviction because 
they were domestic violence victims). 
 220. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580(1). 
 221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2000). The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimi-
nation against tenants or potential tenants “because of race, color, religion, 
sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id. § 3604(a). 
 222. Eliza Hirst, Note, The Housing Crisis for Victims of Domestic Violence: 
Disparate Impact Claims and Other Housing Protection for Victims of Domes-
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ing housing discrimination.223 States lacking these protections 
for domestic violence victims should seize the opportunity to 
propose them alongside early-termination legislation.224 For 
example, Colorado’s, North Carolina’s, and Washington’s early-
termination laws include provisions prohibiting landlords from 
retaliating against victims of domestic violence.225 If domestic 
violence victims face the choice of remaining with their abusers 
or enduring discrimination from landlords, research suggests 
that victims more often than not will stay in the familiar set-
ting of abuse.226 As such, laws preventing landlords from deny-
ing rental applications, raising rent, or decreasing services of 
domestic violence victims should promote a policy that supports 
victims’ decision to leave their abusers. 
CONCLUSION 
Victims of domestic violence face numerous and complex 
obstacles in deciding to leave their abusers. For those who re-
side in rental housing, the cost of terminating their rental 
agreement constitutes one more barrier to escaping the abuse. 
Although prevailing culture may presume that landlords’ right 
to the benefit of their bargain trumps any rights of their ten-
ants, in practice, tenants often prevail when their human dig-
 
tic Violence, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 141–42 (2003). In con-
structing a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act, domestic vio-
lence victims must prove four elements: (1) discriminatory effect, (2) evidence 
of discriminatory intent, (3) that the landlord had an interest in taking the al-
legedly discriminatory action, and (4) that affirmative relief (requiring the 
landlord to house the protected tenants) would adequately remedy the situa-
tion. Id. at 142–43. The Fair Housing Act has been rather uniformly applied to 
protect the rights of domestic violence victims. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 
394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677–78 (D. Vt. 2005) (holding that discrimination against 
a domestic violence victim constitutes sex discrimination under the Fair Hous-
ing Act); United States ex. rel. Alvera v. C.B.M. Group, Inc., CV 01-857-PA (D. 
Or. filed June 8, 2001), http://www.nhlp.org/lalshac/decree.pdf. 
 223. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-8-4 (LexisNexis 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 67-5909 (Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West Supp. 2005) (repealed 
effective July 1, 2006). 
 224. Rhode Island is one of the few states that explicitly prohibits housing 
discrimination against domestic violence victims. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-37-1,  
-2, -2.4, -3, -4 (Supp. 2005). 
 225. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-402(1) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-45.1 
(2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580(1); see also H.R. 2864, 80th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Kan. 2004); S. 2328, 184th Gen. Ct. § 9 (Mass. 2006). 
 226. See generally BERRY, supra note 10, at 8, 10 (providing useful domes-
tic violence statistics); MILLS, supra note 11, at 60–63 (explaining the diffi-
culty women have leaving abusive relationships). 
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nity is at risk. Fortunately, a few states are blazing the trail by 
amending their landlord-tenant codes to exempt victims from 
standard termination procedures, thereby improving the ability 
of victims to leave their abusers. Until more states follow suit, 
however, many domestic violence victims like Martha Smith 
who are prepared to leave their abusers must overcome the fi-
nancial penalties associated with early lease termination. 
